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Abstract
The Stern Review (2006) on the economics of climate change presented a cost estimate
of perhaps even 20% of national income and subsequently was criticized by Weitzman
and Nordhaus and others in a discussion that centered on the use of the calculus of
variations and the choice of the proper rate of discount. The Tinbergen & Hueting
(1991) approach deals with the wider environmental collapse, is not formulated in the
form of the calculus of variations, and arrives at a sustainable level of national income
of about 50% of national income. The Tinbergen & Hueting (TH) approach appears to
be neglected by Weitzman, Nordhaus and Stern (WNS) but appears to be better
grounded in economic theory, mathematically richer and empirically more relevant.
This paper clarifies the misunderstandings and omissions in the work by WNS on
environmental economics.
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2Introduction
Jan Tinbergen’s 1929 Ph. D. thesis – his own copy apparently for sale for EUR 3300 at
antiqbook – contains a decent amount of analysis in the calculus of variations, see
Boumans (1992). This mathematical approach is also used by Martin Weitzman,
William Nordhaus and Nicholas Stern (WNS) to discuss sustainable development and
the economics of climate change.
Tinbergen (1903 – 1994) was also involved with the more practical problems of data
gathering, national accounting, model formulation and number crunching. His attention
in 1969 and 1990 was drawn to publications by Hueting, then head of the dept. of
environmental statistics at CBS Statistics Netherlands, and this resulted in the
Tinbergen & Hueting (1991) (TH) paper GNP and Market Prices: Wrong Signals for
Sustainable Economic Success that Mask Environmental Destruction. Their approach
appears to be very important, but it is not formulated in the language of the calculus of
variations (though some parts are). Remarkably, Tinbergen (1985) does not refer to
Hueting’s work but the explanation must be that he takes this work so for granted that it
does not occur to him that a reference might be useful. Tinbergen (1985:118) discusses
‘counterproduction’ (sometimes also called ‘double counting’ but nowadays called
‘asymmetric entries’ by Hueting). An example would be a catalyst for the exhausts from
a car: the value added in its production should not be included in national income since
it only restores the clean air that existed before.
Young econometricians currently trained in environmental economics tend to focus on
the mathematically elegant approach of the calculus of variations while they have come
to neglect the Tinbergen & Hueting approach, and, in path-dependency, they continue to
neglect it. Even the Stern Review with its ethical approach to the calculus of variations
neglects the TH approach on sustainable national income. Major critiques on the Stern
Review were on the rate of discount and the ethics within the framework of the calculus
of variations, but none of the widely cited economists referred to the TH approach, see
Nordhaus (2007a) and Weitzman (2007ab) themselves but also e.g. Dasgupta (2007a)
and Tol (2006), and also Quiggin (2006) on this discussion itself. If this neglect of the
Tinbergen & Hueting approach continues, a major resource and strand of economic
thought is left unused.
3This present paper wishes to clarify the situation. The best approach is to take the angle
from TH and comment on WNS. This ought to help readers of WNS – if not WNS
themselves – to better understand the value of TH. This present paper can be seen as a
companion to Colignatus (2008) that reviewed the earlier history of the TH approach.
The TH figure for environmentally sustainable national income (eSNI) is about 50% of
national income (NI), while the Stern Review arrives at costs of at most 20% of NI. This
sizeable difference caused me to look deeper into the Stern Review and its critics.
Economists are a bit reluctant, as I myself, to think in terms of survival and collapse.
Dupont (2008:47), writing in Volume 50 of Survival, a journal of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London: “In the security domain, strategic doctrines
and defence budgets are frequently justified on the basis of far less observable evidence
than we have about the climate future which awaits us.” He mentions various ecological
risks in the same way as will be done below, clarifying that the terms of survival and
collapse are proper, and that this indeed is the framework of discussion.
The G8 in Japan July 2008 stated that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) should be
reduced by at least 50% in 2050, though not stating explicitly from what base year,
although the Chair later said to intend 2008. In that respect, one of the major steps
towards recognition seems to have been taken.  However, taking only the index of GHG
or even temperature seems insufficient to guide policy and it seems best to have an
indicator for environmentally sustainable income (eSNI) alongside national income
(NI). The following discussion thus is not only important for understanding the issue of
survival versus collapse but also for the selection of the proper policy indicators.
The two approaches
The Weitzman, Nordhaus and Stern (WNS) discussion has an interesting structure. In
particular: (1) Weitzman (1976) determines the stationary equivalent of future
consumption, which can be interpreted as sustainable income for the market sector only.
Then Nordhaus (1995), referring to Karl-Gustaf Löfgren 1992, extends the calculus
with non-market resources. Shadow prices follow from a well-defined production
function. (2) While Nordhaus and Weitzman see no cause for urgent action, the Stern
Review (2006) advises to more active policies, emphasizing the risks of climate change,
4i.e. the catastrophies or events with low probability but high negative impact. The Stern
Review uses a low rate of discount for the actual calculations, and subsequently
Nordhaus (2007a) and Weitzman (2007a) criticize that low rate. (3) Weitzman (2007ab)
concludes that the ‘traditional approach’ in the calculus of variations – as used by the
Stern Review but in fact also developed by Weitzman himself – neglects uncertainty
and risk with respect to catastrophies. The certainty calculus in the Stern Review would
not fit the texts on the risks. Weitzman then actually reformulates the calculus so that
we now have a variant that can deal with some uncertainty. Then the road to more
active policies is open again. It appears that the Stern Review uses a ‘certainty
equivalent’ or an ‘ethical reduced form’ of a mathematically proper ‘uncertainty
calculus of variations’. Order and decency in economic advice are restored.
The mentioned mathematical structure makes philosophical sense. Ethics has everything
to do with survival. Ethical issues relate to the functioning of the group with respect to
survival of the group and the species. Survival not only relates to the everyday
economic chores for food and shelter, where there is always the distinction between
basic needs and luxuries, but survival comes clearly to the fore in all urgency under
catastrophies such as fires, floods, bad harvests and so on. Where the Stern Review
apparently lacked the mathematical sophistication that Weitzman so handsomely
provided the Review still made sense where it formulated the issue with the tools at
hand.
The TH approach formulates standards for non-renewable resources and eight
environmental functions (space, water, soil, concentrations of nutrients, radiation,
temperature, toxids, localities), and imposes those standards on the model.
5Tinbergen & Hueting (1991)
Thus, in this piece of economic advice, on one hand there is the mathematically elegant
approach of the calculus of variations and on the other hand there is the more practical
and statistical approach. The two schools (with Tinbergen at bottom in both) have not
yet come together, causing different policy advices, and this already lasts a number of
years. Between Tinbergen & Hueting in 1991 and the Stern Review in 2006, both
advising strong action, there are already 15 years. In this day and age those 15 years
mean a population growth of 1 billion people. Where Tinbergen & Hueting in 1991
were worried already by the past change of the world population from 4 to 5 billion, we
now are in the worries about the current change from 6 to 7 billion. Quick effective
action, e.g. possibly by turning development aid into family and pension planning
policies, can mean a lot for environmental sustainability. This earlier window of
opportunity has now been lost, perhaps because of mathematical formulation or perhaps
because of political will. With the new sophistication by Weitzman we can observe that
the mathematically elegant approach confirms the precautionary but perhaps less
elegant approach by Tinbergen & Hueting. Hopefully, the two schools (with Tinbergen
at bottom in both) can come together and there can arise some consensus in policy
advice now, and develop the particulars of that advice.
In fact, with the new Weitzman reformulation of the precautionary principle, the
Tinbergen & Hueting approach stands rather vindicated and it would at least be curious
6why advice with a proven track record of wisdom is neglected, not looked into, not
referred to and forgotten.
Interestingly, Tinbergen was a mentor for Tjalling Koopmans (1910 – 1985), see the
obituary by Scarf (not dated), and Koopmans was a mentor for Weitzman, see
Weitzman (2001) dedicating that paper to him, while also Nordhaus has been affiliated
consistently with the Cowles Foundation. It may be hoped that the Tinbergen and
Koopmans way of doing economics finds new inspiration for their younger generations.
The current neglect of the TH analysis is not fitting to this figure in the history of
economics.
A main point to observe is that the models in the calculus of variations considered by
WNS are very stylized constructs that omit the prisoners’ dilemma and negotiation costs
of non-market resources. Precisely the latter are the very core of the environmental
problem. The problem of co-ordination within a nation and between or across nations
are the crucial issues here. On this count alone, economists would already focus on the
TH approach. The following comments thus are rather on the fringe, caused by the
particular properties of the WNS approach, but nevertheless still interesting and relevant
for graduate students in the calculus of variations and for readers desiring to understand
the political economy of environmental survival versus collapse.
Rightly scaring people
My own way of scaring people in Holland is, see Colignatus (2007) (in Dutch), by
pointing to the fact, not the risk, that in a “business as usual” (BAU) scenario the
Greenland ice will melt, causing severe flooding of Holland. Raising dikes will be
extremely costly, since sandy undergrounds require foundations, and more water
filtering in from under the dikes anyway because of the increased pressure. The
drowning of Amsterdam need not happen this current century but in BAU it does at
some time. Check:
“Some temperature triggers, like 3 or 4º of warming, could be reached this century if
warming occurs quite rapidly. (…) This would commit the world to increases in sea
level of around 5 to 12-m over coming centuries to millennia (…)” Stern (2007)
Weitzman (2007a) is informative of the risk that it actually happens this very century:
7“Translated into the language of the simple model used here, such rare disasters are far
out in the right tail of very high ∆T, which corresponds to being far out in the left tail of
the consumption-growth random variable g. The probability distribution of long-run ∆T
is disturbingly spread apart, largely because of structural-parameter uncertainty about
the unknown “climate sensitivity” multiplier that amplifies GHG concentrations into
ultimate steady-state greenhouse warming. The recently-released Fourth Assessment
Report of the IPCC (2007) predicts for one hundred years from now a mean temperature
change of further planetary warming (from averaging six “equally sound” marker
scenarios) of E[∆T] ≈ 2.8°C with a thick-tailed upper-end standard deviation ≈1.6°C
(Table SPM-3). This means the probability that ∆T > 4.5°C is approximately 15% and
the probability of ∆T > 6°C is very roughly about 3%. IPCC does not extend its
projections beyond 2105 on the basis that predictions into the 22nd century are too
uncertain, but it seems unavoidable that the reduced-form probability of ∆T > 6°C
increases substantially above 3% after the next century just from the enormous inertial
lags for what by then will be in the climate-change pipeline. Societies and ecosystems
whose average temperature has changed in the course of a century or so by ∆T > 6°C
(for U.S. readers: ∆6°C ≈ ∆11°F) are located in the terra incognita of what any honest
economic modeler would have to admit is a planet Earth reconfigured as science fiction,
since such high temperatures have not existed for some tens of millions of years.”
Weitzman (2007a)
When discussing other scare factors, Weitzman (2007a) reads like literature:
“There is little doubt that the worst-case scenarios of global-warming catastrophes are
genuinely frightening. The Stern Review goes over several of these highly-unlikely
poorly-understood threshold-crossing disasters associated with abrupt large-scale
irreversible changes in the climate system: sudden collapse of the Greenland and West
Antarctica ice sheets, weakening or even reversal of thermohaline circulations that
might radically affect such things as the Gulf Stream and European climate, runaway
climate-sensitivity amplification of global warming due to positive-reinforcing
multiplier feedbacks (including, but not limited to, loss of polar albedo, weakened
carbon sinks, and rapid releases of methane from the thawing of arctic permafrost).
More gradual but still very serious examples of uncertain climate-change effects are:
sea-level dynamics, drowned coastlines of unknown magnitude, very different and
possibly extreme weather patterns including droughts and floods, ecosystem
destruction, mass species extinctions, big changes in worldwide precipitation patterns
and distribution of fresh water, tropical-crop failures, large-scale migrations of human
populations, humidity-nourished contagious diseases, and the list goes on and on.”
Weitzman (2007a)
Dasgupta (2007b) explains that economists – well, not TH, but their exception is not
mentioned – have been deaf to arguments by ecologists:
“Proposition 4 reveals the limitations of overly formal analyses of the economics of
climate change. (We should add to that the economics of biodiversity loss.) I personally
believe that Humanity should invest sufficiently so as to keep global mean temperature
from rising beyond another 2-3 degrees Celsius, even though I realise that the
expenditure that will be required to constrain carbon emissions will be a lot bigger than
the mere 2% of the GDP of rich countries proposed by Stern (2006) if advancements in
global sequestration technologies and technologies using alternative sources of energy
are harder to realise than is currently hoped. But I am unable to justify that belief from
any formal model. Ultimately, it is a “gut feeling” about the awful things that could
8occur if the global mean temperature were to rise another 5 degrees that should make us
very scared.
   Climate change has been taken seriously by all economists who have studied the
science since the late 1970s. Even the now-famous “hockey-stick”, displayed by time
series of carbon concentration in the atmosphere, appeared some time ago (Bolin, 1989:
fig. 5). Moreover, the Second Assessment Report (1996) of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change should have made us acknowledge climate change to be one of the
most significant environmental issues facing Humanity. To be critical of the
“economics of climate change” is not to understate the harm Humanity is inflicting on
itself by degrading the natural environment - not only in regard to the stock of carbon in
the atmosphere, but also in regard to so many other environmental matters besides. But
the cause is not served by misplaced concreteness, especially not when parameter
values are so chosen that they yield currently desired answers.
   For many years ecologists - more generally, environmental scientists - have asked
economists to consider the “precautionary principle” seriously. We did not do so. I
believe what they meant by the term was that we should not play down the possibility of
environmental catastrophies - owing to climate change, species extinctions caused by
habitat destruction, and so forth. The writings of Paul Ehrlich, James Hansen, John
Holdren, Peter Raven, and E.O. Wilson have been critical here. What environmental
scientists meant was that the uncertainties associated with the economic effects of
environmental degradation are very great. But, as the uncertainties were meant to cover
200 years and more, no attempt was made to estimate those uncertainties. Our
colleagues in the environmental sciences were correct not to have done so. Proposition
4 shows us the dangers of misplaced concreteness. (…)
   Economics helps us to realise what we are able to say about matters that will reveal
themselves only in the distant future. Simultaneously, it helps us to realise the limits of
what we are able to say. And that too is worth knowing, for limits on what we are able
to say are not a reason for inaction. Climate change and biodiversity losses are two
phenomena that are probably not amenable to formal, quantitative economic analysis.
We economists should have not pressed for what I believe is misplaced concreteness.
Certainly, we should not do so now.” Dasgupta (2007b)
Note that Dasgupta’s claim “Climate change and biodiversity losses are two phenomena
that are probably not amenable to formal, quantitative economic analysis” is in conflict
with the Tinbergen & Hueting (1991) approach, recently updated by Hueting & De Boer
(2001) and Hueting (2008). But Dasgupta does simply not refer to that line of research.
Where Dasgupta states “But the cause is not served by misplaced concreteness,
especially not when parameter values are so chosen that they yield currently desired
answers” there (a) the “desired answers” are derived from an analysis of risk, which is
the actual economic analysis, both proper and sound, while the mathematical model is
only a tool to enhance consistency, (b) he apparently does not see that the Stern Review
choice of parameters reflects certainty equivalence, where, as said, a ‘certainty calculus
of variations’ has to do the work of an (at that time not yet available) ‘uncertainty
calculus of variations’, (c) the odium of “misplaced concreteness” falls on the critics of
the Stern Review who do not see (a) and (b).
9Possibly entertaining people
Following the ‘stick and carrot’ philosophy, and having mentioned the scare above, it
seems proper to allow for some entertainment too. Weitzman’s remark on ‘science
fiction’ is tempting as well. In order to maintain the serious character of this paper,
these more entertaining remarks are put in Appendix A.
Definitions of uncertainty and risk
Weitzman (2007a) explains his notions of uncertainty and risk: “The cost of low-g
disasters from high-∆T scenarios more properly constitutes uncertainty in the sense of
Knight or Keynes than risk, because the scale and probability of these disasters are both
unknown.”
Earlier, Colignatus (1999, 2001) explained that this use of terms by Knight (or Keynes)
is contrary to standard English:
“The commonly adopted definitions of risk and uncertainty generate conceptual
problems and inconsistencies, and they are a source of confusion in general. However,
alternative and proper definitions are: (1) First there is the distinction between certainty
and uncertainty. (2) Uncertainty forks into known (assumed) and unknown
probabilities. (3) Unknown probabilities forks into known categories and unknown
categories. (4) Known categories forks into ‘including the uncertainties in the
probabilities by explicitly assuming a uniform distribution’ (Laplace) or neglect (or use
other non-probabilistic techniques). Note that the term ‘risk’ has not been used in the 4
points above, so that an independent definition is possible. ‘Risk’ can be defined as the
absolute value of probable loss, i.e. as (rho) ρ = -E[X; X < 0]. Also, relative risk is the
probable loss with respect to a target t, giving ρ(t) = t -E[X; X < t]. The definitions
provided here are directly in line with the Oxford English dictionary. It turns out that
textbooks generally can keep their mathematics but will best rewrite their texts to these
definitions. Not only the students and the general public will benefit from this sudden
clarity, but eventually also statistics and economic theory themselves.” Summary of
Colignatus (1999, 2001)
We can be uncertain about parameter values, but that is not uncertainty per se. If the word
“uncertain” causes conceptual difficulties here, say “unknown parameter values”.
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A fat tail is not needed to get scared
Weitzman (2007a) elaborates that the uncertainty in the probabilities causes a reduced form
with a fat tail, (exactly) like a normal distribution with unknown dispersion causes a
Student-t distribution.
However, it is not true that a fat tail is required to get scared about catastrophes. It
suffices to conclude that the probability is not zero, and then the extremity suffices for
the impact. You may have to include above risk measure ρ = -E[X; X < 0] as a separate
entry in the utility function to become aware of this, though. This is precisely what
Chapter 8, “Measuring Utility” by Colignatus (2001, 2007) does.
This discussion somewhat suffers from what Dasgupta rightly calls the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness, though perhaps in a slightly different way. The point is that
mostly everything is uncertain and that there may exist little certainty anyway. For
example, I feel pretty certain that tomorrow the beach at Scheveningen will still be
there, but, of course, neither I nor the beach may be there anymore. Where the Stern
Review uses the ‘certainty calculus of variations’ it is mathematically proper to criticize
it for not using the ‘uncertainty’ version, and it is mathematically impressive to create
such a version, but it misrepresents the original idea that the whole exercise was
intended to deal with the uncertainties of the future. It basically misunderstands that it is
standard procedure in economics to use the ‘certain’ tools at hand, even while everyone
knowns that subject matters in economics are generally uncertain.
Note that pure certainty is caught in the “Definition & Reality methodology”, that uses
definitions to say something about the uncertain future – see Colignatus (2005). That
piece of analysis is in fact presented as a somewhat new approach, given that normal
analyses deal with uncertainties.
In the same vein it would be incorrect to criticize TH for not even using the calculus of
variations or not inventing the right kind of calculus. It would be a valid mathematical
observation but it would not be relevant for the economic analysis that is under concern.
Instead of getting lost into this kind of critique, economists would do better in studying
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TH and improve on the economic analysis, using adequate mathematical and statistical
techniques.
With respect to the Stern Review, one of the conclusions by Weitzman is:
“However, in my opinion Stern deserves a measure of discredit for giving readers an
authoritative-looking impression that seemingly-objective best-available-practice
professional economic analysis robustly supports its conclusions, instead of more-
openly disclosing the full extent to which the Review’s radical policy recommendations
depend upon controversial extreme assumptions and unconventional discount rates that
most mainstream economists would consider much too low.” Weitzman (2007a)
This is a valid mathematical criticism but not correct for a professor of economics. The
economic analysis is primarily in the evaluation of the risks while the mathematical
implementation is only a way to enhance consistency and clarity. Perhaps the hot potato
is passed on to “most mainstream economists” who have not read TH and who have
been neglecting the ecological warnings for years. But being in a majority only carries
the weight of a majority and we should be more interested in some Elo-rating as in
chess. Somehow, the profession has not yet found a way to define a tournament but that
in itself would be a strange kind of excuse in a discussion like this.
Facts, of the past and of reality
Above, I used the phrase “the fact, not the risk, that in a “business as usual” (BAU)
scenario the Greenland ice will melt”. Some readers may object to this use of language,
since in their opinion facts occur only in the past, not in the uncertain future. Even a
BAU scenario might contain an unforeseen discovery of cheap energy while a
sustainable scenario might contain an unforeseen collapse.
Admittedly, I like to keep my use of language as strict as mathematics itself and thus the
following comments can be clarifying. The phrase “the fact, not the risk, that in a
“business as usual” (BAU) scenario the Greenland ice will melt” is an exact verbal
translation of A  = “Greenland ice will melt” and π  =  P(A | BAU) = 1, where the BAU
scenario is defined as a certainty equivalent. The statement and context are rather not an
issue of risk but rather an issue of conditionality.
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The colloquial term “fact” tends to relate to the past but allows also for “reality” in
which there is also a future. The dictionary by Hornby (1985) gives:
“1 [C] sth that has happened or been done (…) 2 [C] sth known to be true or accepted as
true (…) 3 [U] reality; what is true; what exists (…)” Hornby (1985)
When the discussion context is the future, then people generally understand that the
word “fact” is not used in the sense of referring to the past. It is reasonable to expect
that people understand the word as an expression of truth and reality.
Let us consider a patient asking a medical doctor whether he will die. A generally
acceptable answer is: “Eventually you will die for sure, but, when, my prognosis is
(…)”. It would be generally considered a bit of humour or sarcasm, depending upon the
patient-doctor relationship, when the answer would be: “You will not die when they
invent an immortality drug and you keep out of the way of fatal accidents.”
Let A  = “Greenland ice will melt”
BAU = a “business as usual” scenario, defined as certainty equivalence
SUS = a “sustainability” scenario, defined as certainty equivalence
             u background risk from cases and probabilities not considered
other variables defined as in Table 1
Table 1. Clarification of certainty equivalence
Certainty equivalence, BAU and SUS Uncertainty, BAU* and SUS*
π   =  P(A | BAU) = 1 0 < π*  = P (A | BAU*) < 1
ς    = P(A | SUS) = 0 0 < ς*  = P(A | SUS*) < 1
p   = P(BAU) =  p*       (alt.  p = p* π*) p*  = P(BAU*)
q   = P(SUS)  = q*        (alt.  q  = q* ς*) q*  = P(SUS*)
u   = u* +  q* ς* – p*(1 – π*)      (alt. otherwise) u*
P(A) = p π + q ς  + u = p + u P(A) = p* π* + q* ς*  + u*
In terms of uncertainty, we would consider p π, which under certainty equivalence
reduces to p. Some may hold that such certainty equivalence is not possible, since the
future is always uncertain. In the present state of environmental developments they are
rather like a M.D. who seriously considers the chance of an immortality drug. In that
case they presume a BAU* scenario as the true scenario, with π* ≠ 1 and some p*.
However, we may define the BAU case with p = p* π*, and hence there actually is a
certainty equivalence. It is clearer, though, to also include the SUS scenario and choose
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equal probabilities p = p* and q = q*, which has been taken as the default case in the
table. Note that there is a social welfare function (SWF) in each scenario so that the
choice or the regime switch can be represented by a Meta-SWF(BAU, SUS), with the
probabilities possibly seen as weights, see Colignatus (2000).
Scenario analysis and cost-benefit analysis
In this respect, there also appears to exist a crucial issue when we consider scenario
analysis and cost-benefit analysis. Note that with a Meta-SWF(BAU, SUS), as just
mentioned, each path has its own utility function and parameters, and that the switch is
an overall-preference. Colignatus (1992, 1995) used the notation SWF(x, I) where I Є
{0, 1} represents information or the regime. This approach helped me to understand the
TH approach that I later encountered. When we observe the economy of a democratic
nation, it is tempting, with Samuelson, to see the results as revealed preferences. For
TH, these results may however also be revealed blockages. Prisoners’ dilemma and
negotiation costs may hinder the expression of the true preferences. In fact, there is
uncertainty as to what the real preferences are. By consequence, it will not do to use a
single utility function, to assume that the economy is in the Pangloss optimal state and
then perform a cost-benefit analysis to another Pangloss optimal state – and this will not
work since the original state is already optimal. Instead, we have to use different utility
parameters for the different paths, allow each path to be optimal, and let the costs and
benefits from switching be conditional, for example, if BAU is optimal with respect to
SWFBAU then it is suboptimal with respect to SWFSUS, and if the latter would be the true
SWF, then we can calculate the net advance from the costs and benefits of a switch
from BAU to SUS. See Colignatus (2000) for an example.
Note that the widely cited Bovenberg & De Mooij (1994) and the De Mooij (1999)
thesis on the ‘double dividend’ use only one SWF and thus are a bit less relevant for the
proper policy question. Note too that when such analyses were to be performed with the
calculus of variations, that there would also be another confusion to avoid, when
translating the results to the real world (or a realistic model of the real world). The
simplest models use uniform taxation so that the marginal rate is also the average rate. It
would be standard economics, and fitting to the framework of optimization, to draw
conclusions on the marginal tax rate. However, for reality, we should keep in mind that
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tax schemes have exemptions and are indexed on inflation or the level of subsistence.
Therefor, the translation should not be to the statutory marginal tax rate but to the
proper ‘dynamic marginal tax rate’, that actually would be closer to the average rate, see
Colignatus (1992:272) or Colignatus (2005:140-145).
The Sterner & Persson approach
Sterner & Persson (2007) criticize the single sector (corn model) approach in the
traditional form of the calculus of variations:
“While we find no strong objections to the discounting assumptions adopted in the
Stern Review, our main point is that the conclusions reached in the review can be
justified on other grounds than by using a low discount rate. We argue that nonmarket
damages from climate change are probably underestimated and that future scarcities
that will be induced by the changing composition of the economy and climate change
should lead to rising relative prices for certain goods and services, raising the estimated
damage of climate change and counteracting the effect of discounting.” From the
Summary of Sterner & Persson (2007)
This argument thus has the same structure as the certainty equivalent to an uncertainty
calculus of variations model. In this case the true model is disaggregated but it can be
aggregated into an ‘ethical reduced form’. Of necessity, these authors state: “If we were
to have both low discount rates and changing relative prices, we would find even
stronger support for firm and immediate abatement measures.”
Of the various papers mentioned here, the Sterner & Persson paper comes closest to the
TH approach, and thus might be a bridge towards understanding.
A small note on calculating the damage
Weitzman (2007a) recalls the way how the damage due to climate change is calculated
in this kind of study:
D(t) = Y*(t) – Y(t) = f(∆T(t)) Y*(t)
“where t is time, D is the total damages of greenhouse warming, ∆T is atmospheric
temperature relative to the base period, Y* is potential GDP (or NDP, no distinction
being made here) in the absence of any greenhouse warming, and Y is actual GDP with
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greenhouse warming.” If I understand this correctly (but this may also be a formulation
that is confusing to me) this approach assumes that there is some autonomous growth in
Y*, say g = 2%, that is unaffected by environmental degradation. Thus:
D(t) = Y*(0) (1 + g) 
t
 - Y(t)
However, it is a bit strange to assume that ‘no global warming’ can come about without
additional costs. Only when we are prepared to make costs then we may reduce global
warming. Potential growth has to take place in an environment where growth becomes
increasingly difficult due to environmental change. A Holland that builds dikes has less
time to paint sunflowers.
Rather, one would prefer the Hueting & De Boer (2001:46) approach: “We work
towards these goals by discussing a series of cases of increasing relevance to our
problem: (1) preferences for environmental functions are unimportant because functions
are abundant; (2) functions are scarce and preferences are such that the optimal path
(computed by the model) approximates the actual path; (3) preferences for the
environment are stronger than in the second case, but there are blockages preventing
their full expression; (4) preferences are as strong as in the third case, but the blockages
have been overcome; and (5) the special form of the last case in which preferences for
sustainability are general and dominant.”
Apparently, D(t) = Y*(t) – Y(t) gives the difference between case 1 and 2, and can be
denoted as D1,2(t) = Y1(t) – Y2(t). As said, this is only very hypothetical since path (1) is
pure phantasy. Relevant are the costs of sustainability D2,5(t) = Y2(t) – Y5(t), where (5)
creates the case that has temperature under some control.
Admittedly, there is a sense in which people regard ‘the cost of temperature rise’, as a
conditional. Note that Y(t) = Y(t | T(t)). Then D(t | s) = Y(t | T(s)) – Y(t) = f(T(t) | s), for
e.g. s = 0 or s = t – 1 or s = a value that gives sustainability. Thus when people see
damages depend upon the temperature then this is rather a counterfactual than a
potential. Controlled temperature might only be a potential if we were to invest in
prevention, but it is not a given, something that can be seen as falling from the sky like
manna. With T(t) = T(t-1) + ∆T(Y(t)) we also note that production causes CO2 exhausts
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and then a rise in temperature (likely with more lags), so that Y(t | T(s)) is not realistic
for s ≠ t.
It might be that the two approaches – either assuming some constant growth in
“potential output” or the latter approach based upon the real production function –
would be equivalent in practice with respect to the calculation of “costs”. But the latter
approach remains more tractable and true to fact.
Rate of discount
(a) Note that market rates of discount do not substract for the non-market loss of
environmental functions. For example, we would frequently like to see r ≈ g, and the
correction of g for environmental deterioration would similarly apply to r.
(b) In that sense, it may very well be that Nordhaus (2007a) who emphasizes the use of
the market rate of discount too, has been less sensitive to Nordhaus (1995), who
considers the non-market sector. See the next section.
Nordhaus and sustainability
Professor Nordhaus has contributed importantly to environmental economics, with
Nordhaus & Tobin (1971) Is growth obsolete and Nordhaus (1976) Economic Growth
and Climate: The Carbon Dioxide Problem – with the apt statement “Unlike many of
the wolf cries, this one, in my opinion, should be taken very seriously” – and with
Nordhaus (1995) extending the calculus of variations with non-market resources, and
subsequently the DICE model and geographical modeling.
There are three main points to observe.
(1) Nordhaus (1995) starts out with a promising paragraph:
“With growing concern about our crowded globe and increasing awareness of global
environmental problems, environmentalists and governments have launched a crusade
for “sustainable economic development”. This concept, popularized by the report of the
Brundtland Commission (1987 / TC) and often adopted by critics of economic growth,
was defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
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the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.  The general notion here is
that humanity is wasting its natural endowments – “natural capital” such as appropriated
natural resources like energy resources, nonfuel minerals, and soils; appropriated
renewable resources like forests and aquifers; and vital environmental resources like
clean air and water, the stock of genetic material, and the present climate. The dangers
range from mundane ones of trash to the more ominous ones of economic decline or
even climatic apocalypse.”
Subsequently, however, the paper (i) defines a mathematical notion of “sustainable
income”, (ii) fails to define and estimate environmental use, (iii) presents a notion of
“knowledge” as a non-market resource relevant for “sustainability”, (iv) measures this
resource from total factor productivity (TFP) that still excludes the environment, and (v)
then concludes “that consumption has historically been far below sustainable income”.
The reasoning is that future generations will have so much knowledge that translates in
TFP that past generations have been a bit irrational in saving so much for descendants
who will be rich anyway. This approach reminds of the 1928 lecture by John Maynard
Keynes Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (included in Essays in
Persuasion – no reference needed). Nevertheless, it is a bit absurd to start out with the
problem of environmental sustainability and the risk of apocalypse and see those
disappear in the discussion and the conclusion.
In sum, the Nordhaus (1995) paper is enlightening for the concepts and mathematics
involved but at the same time very confusing for the issue of environmental
sustainability, i.e. what the Brundtland Commission (1987), Ahmad, El Serafy and Lutz
(eds.) (1989), Hueting (1989) and Tinbergen & Hueting (1991) are concerned about.
While many economists neglected the environment, Nordhaus stands out as one who
took it serious, but his serious endeavour apparently obscures the fact that he did not
take it serious enough. Appendix B clarifies this, starting with Nordhaus & Tobin
(1971) and following the history of this line of research.
An important point in this appendix is: “According to Tinbergen & Hueting it is not a
relevant discussion what to choose, either NI or eSNI, and economists should use both
figures. The idea is to provide people with information about the state of the economy,
and not to impose, as a caste of know-all economists, what kind of “income” people
have to use.”
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(2) Nordhaus (1995) refers to Ahmad et al. (1989) – in retrospect a major publication on
implementing sustainability in environmental accounting – and he refers specifically to
the first 3 chapters but not specifically to Hueting (1989), chapter 6 in that same
volume. Economic science may have missed a crucial meeting of minds here. Nordhaus
(1995), in other references, refers to again other authors on sustainability but neither to
Hueting’s other writings nor to TH. Also, there is no adequate channel from TH towards
Nordhaus, as Hueting (2001) clarifies that various of these authors have crucial
misunderstandings about the TH approach.
(3) Nordhaus (2007b), Key Potential Improvements in Statistics and Data for Policies
Concerning Global Warming: The Role of Federal Statistical Agencies, was prepared
for the US National Research Council, Committee on National Statistics. It is relevant
to note that Hueting developed Dutch environmental statistics and (in a personal
communication to the present author) in the past has visited the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) and found little response to his suggestions.
Appendix C contains my own selection of Key points in Nordhaus’s Key points. Here,
it suffices to restate his summary recommendation:
“(33) The summary recommendation here is that U.S. federal statistical agencies need
to become even more active in the international statistical system if we are to improve
international socioeconomic data for research in global warming. The quality of our
models with a global public good like global warming is in a deep statistical sense a
“weakest-link” technology. Obviously, the U.S. should not neglect its own data needs or
improvements in its own system. However, in the global warming area, there would be
a large payoff if the major federal statistical agencies could share their expertise to help
countries with limited expertise and resources to improve methodologies and data
systems.” Nordhaus (2007b)
Apparently, Nordhaus considers Holland to have “limited expertise and resources” since
the TH approach was not considered relevant to look into. It is also remarkable that the
recommendation is formulated in 2007 while the issue is known since the 1970’s. I
don’t intend to sound humourous or sarcastic, depending upon the author-reader
relationship, but I don’t think that it would be so advisable that the US comes to
Holland to ‘help out’ with the Dutch environmental statistics – though it would really
help out when some American students would be willing to listen and study.
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Conclusion
This paper compared a Harvard – Yale approach with a The Hague – Voorburg
approach. Jan Tinbergen was present at the roots of both approaches and would have
wished integration.
The Stern Review (2006) scared the public and policy makers with costs of climate
change that might even rise to 20% of national income. The Review also scared
economists for its use of economic theory. Nordhaus (2007a), Weitzman (2007a),
Dasgupta (2007a), Tol (2006) and others formulated strong critiques, see also Quiggin
(2006) on this discussion and possibly Lomborg (2007) for a discussion for the larger
public. These critics have a track record in economic publications on the environment
and sustainability, and it is striking that precisely these environmental economists have
been so critical of the Stern Review.
As Aronson (1992) explains on the working of the human mind: if a smoker advises
others not to smoke, then this has more convincing power than when a non-smoker does
so. Apparently having no vested interest, increases impartiality. In the same way,
environmental economists warning against the economics in the Stern Review will have
more convincing power to the public and policy makers than those supporting it.
The Stern Review understated the environmental challenge by looking mainly at the
issue of climate change and not the other issues that are caused by a world population
possibly rising towards two-digit numbers and often aspiring at material increase. And
now the state of disinformation is increased and complicated by these strong critiques.
The only way to clarify the situation is by considering the arguments. This paper has
dutifully tried to do so. We have taken a position akin to Tinbergen & Hueting (1991),
see also Colignatus (2008), have evaluated the various points and provided some
criticisms to the Stern Review, some of its critics and some of the critics of the those,
proceeding to the fourth level of critique. Then, while having kept an open and critical
mind, we have returned to the original position: that Tinbergen & Hueting (1991) still
provide the best approach, even though it is rather neglected in the economic literature.
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A major point is that key authors in this debate mistook some techniques in
econometrics for economics itself. This is a risk in economic research that Tinbergen
has been warning about, see Jolink (2007), perhaps also out of personal experience.
Historians may later judge that he helped to create a monster, namely a system of
economic advice that puts higher value on technique than on content. Alternatively, they
may find that such a system likely would have arisen anyway due to the Western
cultural attitude to mathematical technique, but that Tinbergen managed to install some
common sense – that is: if we follow his example.
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Appendix A. Possibly entertaining people (continued)
Following the ‘stick and carrot’ philosophy, and having mentioned the scare above, it
seems proper to allow for some entertainment too. Weitzman’s remark on ‘science
fiction’ is tempting as well. Let me admit that I write science fiction on occasion, see
Acapulco Jones (2007), styled after Indiana Jones but with a better beach. Readers
might also enjoy Terry Pratchett (2007) on the life of a Central Banker with a Phillips
machine in the basement.
One point to observe is that, with Nordhaus partly in the right court, technology may
hold wonderful surprises. On the other hand, the precautionary principle is that we
cannot reasonably plan to have what we cannot reasonably expect to have yet. Past rates
of growth are misleading since they are contaminated by wrong accounting for the
environment.
But of course, our phantasy allows all kinds of escape routes.
An example is that our skin is modified to contain chlorophyll, cutting short the food
chain. An example is a subsidy for small people, who indeed require less energy. Soon,
the little green men are here.
Another idea is to consider the Mediterranean, concentrate sunlight by mirrors, catch
and guide the humid air in pipes towards the Sahara, and let water condensate there.
Colignatus (2006) is a bit more developed and contains two extravagant ideas, just in
case that the world is not interested in the Dutch problem of saving Amsterdam. One
idea is to use a gigantic geothermal machine, or a myriad of small ones, to create dikes
from ice (also freezing the soft underground), and also take the CO2 out of the air that
other nations put there. That might really CO2L IT. Another is to rearrange the Rhine
river, that in the BAU scenario will cause a lot of inland problems too. Perhaps these
approaches can be made feasible – I am not an engineer – and perhaps there is a Coase
Theorem applicable here.
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All these possibilities are as serious as the Weitzman (2007a) explorative remark: “Such
emergency measures are likely to be so extreme as to be defensible only for an even-
more-extreme environmental catastrophe in the making – perhaps they might include
painting all human-made structures on the planet reflective white and creating a
“Pinatubo effect” by seeding the upper atmosphere with metallic dust or aerosols.
(footnote)”. See Lomborg (2007) for similar suggestions.
Schuiling & Krijgsman (2006) are geophysical scientists who propose to grind olivine
to sequester CO2. This seems a more serious option than the statements above.
Schuiling earlier suggested injecting underground limestone layers with acids to create
gypsum, thereby raising the floor of Holland. The new label is “macro-engineering”.
It stands to reason, though, that all such measures represent costs. These are
expenditures required to restore what we had before environmental scarcity set in.
When future newspapers report that Holland has an amazing “economic growth”, due to
the construction of dikes and similar projects, then this would derive from misguided
national income accounting that masks that the Dutch are actually hurting a lot. In the
work by TH we can find ways for proper national income accounting so that such costs
do not contaminate our notion of “growth”.
Appendix B. Nordhaus and sustainability (continued)
While many economists neglected the environment, Nordhaus stands out as one who
took it serious, but his serious endeavour apparently obscures the fact that he did not
take it serious enough. This appendix clarifies this, starting with Nordhaus & Tobin
(1971) and following the history of this line of research. It will be useful to itemize the
comments.
(1) On Nordhaus & Tobin (1971): (a) On catastrophes, they state:
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Clearly, ecologists in 1971 had different opinions. Thus, “economics alone” is not the
proper reference.
(b) On the index of welfare: the inclusion of other items such as leisure is OK when the
goal is to measure welfare from luxuries but the ecological discussion is about survival
and no amount of leisure can substitute for a catastrophe.
(c) A more minor point, but still serious enough, is that Hueting (1974, 1980:183-184)
criticizes the approach on urbanization.
(2) Nordhaus (1976) concludes to a “little change” scenario with a horizon of 20-40
years:
But later the DICE model causes a similar conclusion – a drift of the horizon. This drift
is perhaps due to the discounting, and perhaps this is like the temporal or dynamic
inconsistency that may also affect the credibility of a Central Bank. Something to look
into.
(3) Nordhaus (1995) gives a laudable extension of the calculus of variations, referring
also to apparently a similar paper by Karl-Gustaf Löfgren 1992. PM. As far as I have
been able to see, Nordhaus (1994) contains a similar argument and was published
outside of the Cowles Foundation; in contrast the Nordhaus (1995) paper apparently has
remained a CF mimeo.
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(4)  The Nordhaus paper actually agrees with the Hueting approach, later adopted by
Tinbergen & Hueting (1991), that both the standard measure for national income and
the Weitzman (1976) sustainable national income for markets are inadequate when there
are relevant non-market resources. Statistical offices around the world must be shocked
to realize this. That is, they will know, conceptually, that such definitions exist, but to
actually implement them, and to accept that a shortcut made in the 1930s is no longer
sufficient for our times, is another story. Statistical offices that associate ‘facts’ with
‘the past’ and not with ‘reality’ that includes a future, have to face that paradigm switch.
(5) The various authors in Ahmad et al. (1989), and in particular Hueting (1989) and
Tinbergen & Hueting (1991), are concerned with environmental sustainability, while
Nordhaus (1995) generalizes and in fact uses “knowledge” rather than “nature” as his
prime example. This generalization is alright as a mathematical exercise but the
economic problem was ecological survival and the required adaptation of economic
accounting procedures to facilitate survival. Nordhaus’s neglect of the basic problem
causes all kinds of irrelevant criticisms. For example, he criticizes various authors for
not including expected growth of knowledge in their notions of sustainable income. Yet
knowledge is not the problem under discussion. In the literature at that time (e.g.
Ahmad et al. (1989)), “sustainable income” meant “environmentally sustainable
income”. It is only because of this misunderstanding of the term “sustainability” that
now the prefix “environmentally” has had to be added (turning SNI into eSNI).
(6) Nordhaus (1995) distinguishes different concepts of “income”. Here he follows
Hicks (1939) in Value and Capital. For unclear reasons Hicks’s Definition 1 is labeled
the “Hicksian definition” (production for a limited period, maintaining capital, that
however is defined on prospective returns) and Hicks’s Definition 3 is labeled “Fisher’s
definition” (wealth based, condition on future income). Only the latter would be
“sustainable income”. This causes a curious criticism that authors who work on
sustainable income and who say that they adopt Hicks’s notion on income, would be
inconsistent. Nordhaus also refers to the UN SNA that uses “Hicksian income” and that
would become inconsistent if it would try to implement sustainability “in that manner”.
This is a very curious way of putting things. Rather, I find the TH position more
tractable that the notion of “national income” (NI) is based upon Hicks’s definition 1
and that the notion of “(environmentally) sustainable national income” (eSNI) differs
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from NI by corrections for environmental sustainability. Again, only the environment,
for ecological survival, and not the luxuries.
(7) In the TH work we also find that the definition of NI may well have been adequate
at the time of Hicks, i.e. eSNI ≈ 100% NI, but that now eSNI ≈ 50% NI. According to
Tinbergen & Hueting it is not a relevant discussion what to choose, either NI or eSNI,
and economists should use both figures. The idea is to provide people with information
about the state of the economy, and not to impose, as a caste of know-all economists,
what kind of “income” people have to use.
(8) Note that Nordhaus (1995) confirms that when the economy becomes sustainable (in
his formulas A(t) constant), then NI = eSNI, which is also the TH position.
(9) TH basically calculate only one income value of a base year Y(b), based upon a
trajectory of y(t | b), note the difference between Y and y, and they assume constant
technology given that base year, and thus limited production growth. Their model thus
is a specific application of the Nordhaus (1995) model (and not its solution).
Conceivably, apart from this statistical approach, a planning agency might make
projections of such Y(t) with added expectations on technology. The relation between
this Y(t) and the various y(t | b) is a bit complex, see Hueting & De Boer (2001).
(10) Nordhaus (1995) contains a very curious example of a “wayward spaceship” that
contains a fixed amount of food without possibility of producing more. It does not help
the discussion where he suggests that this might be the position argued by
environmentalists.
(11) Nordhaus (1995) on risk: “A second point concerns the claim in some
environmental writings that the capital-intact definition should apply specifically to
“natural capital”. (…) Natural capital has a claim to be maintained intact, they claim,
because of risks, uncertainties, and irreversibilities in their use. These are more
questions of religion than science. The fact that natural capital is misallocated means
that we should use the appropriate shadow prices but surely does not imply that the
appropriate policy is an absolute prohibition on declining natural stocks. Furthermore,
risks, uncertainties, and irreversibilities are hardly unique to natural capital. (…) Natural
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capital has no natural monopoly on risk and irreversibility.” This neglects that natural
capital has a natural monopoly on survival, which is the relevant notion since we are
discussing the ecological base of human existence. Thus: (a) “some writings” is
unspecified while TH give a well balanced exposition, (b) when the shadow price is
infinite then prohibition ensues, (c) the risk that the Greenland ice melts is serious and
for a long while irreversible, which is well-documented, (d) the fact that an investor can
lose money is not relevant when we are discussing ecological survival. Clearly,
Nordhaus (1995) did not fully understand the ecological challenge and it is striking that
his references are not to ecologists directly but to economists who discuss the ecology –
who need not understand the issue well either, see Hueting (2001) who did take the
ecological question seriously.
(12) The TH approach is to impose sustainability by standards and let the economy
develop under those constraints. TH subsequently discount with a zero rate to the base
year. This is not quite the same as the problem of discounting in the calculus of
variations. Nordhaus (1995) does not take account of this and as a result, we find
various statements on discounting that are confusing with respect to the notion of
sustainability according to the definition of Hueting as used by TH.
(13) Nordhaus (1995) states: “Third, sustainability is an insufficient criterion for
judging the wisdom of a particular economic trajectory. (…) Hence there is no
normative content in the designation of a path as “sustainable”.” (a) This would be a
welcome support for the TH approach, since that approach is frequently labeled as a
political preference for sustainability, while TH hold that sustainability is an objective
notion. (b) However, there is a subtle difference. In the TH approach, both NI and eSNI
are conditional notions, based upon assumptions about the preferences of the economic
agents. What the true preferences are is unknown and thus what the chosen path means
is a bit unclear, except that NI is measured by the statistical office and eSNI is
calculated as a model-based correction upon that (what best should be done by that
statistical office too). When these figures become available as information to the
economic agents, they might adjust their behaviour, with the subsequent year a new set
of NI and eSNI. This is clearly a different kind of process than what Nordhaus has in
mind, even though the statement still remains valid. (c) There is the notion of a Meta-
SWF (social welfare function) that can bring about a regime switch, see Colignatus
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(2000). (d) TH recognize that the Brundtland Report choice for sustainability would
imply a preference. There is a difference between understanding this preference and its
denial.
(14) Nordhaus (1995): “Fourth, some readers have complained that our treatment of
natural capital is incomplete and inadequate. We have considered cases where natural
capital is a perfect substitute for knowledge, which is clearly unlikely and may be
grossly misleading. (…) In addition, we have omitted depletion of natural capital and
corrections for externalities (…) We have done this because there are no reliable
measures of depletion of natural capital (…) However, the results should not be
interpreted as a Panglossian brief for profligacy or neglect. The estimates provided here
may be off base if there are sudden or unpredictable declines in economic activity
because of malfunctioning markets or unforeseen events. But the best remedy for
avoiding disasters is good science not bad economics.” This statement is a bit curious.
(a) The Hueting, Bosch and De Boer (1992) publication at CBS Statistics Netherlands
gave a decent methodology for the calculation of environmentally sustainable national
income, which methodology might also be applied to the USA. Thus there was a
measure. (b) Precisely because of the unpredictable events, economic science uses the
precautionary principle. Thus, based upon this principle, one makes a best estimate, or
provides various scenarios, rather than fully neglecting the issue. Note that Nordhaus
(1995) predates the Weitzman (2007a) analysis on uncertainty, but has the same “good
science versus bad economics” attitude against the use of certainty equivalence. (c) This
episode may be a case where lack of knowledge in 1995-2008 actually is a substitute for
depletion of natural resources and environmental deterioration in 1995-X.
(15) In the conclusions section, Nordhaus (1995) provides support to TH that the UN
SNA are defective with respect to “sustainable income”. However, as said, his concept
of “sustainable” contains a factor “knowlegde” based upon total factor productivity, that
still neglects the environment. This is curious since the subject under discussion is
environmental sustainability.
In sum, the Nordhaus (1995) paper is enlightening for the concepts and mathematics
involved but at the same time very confusing for the issue of environmental
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sustainability, i.e. what the Brundtland Commission (1987), Ahmad et al. (1989),
Hueting (1989) and Tinbergen & Hueting (1991) are concerned about.
(16) For the apparent precursor Nordhaus (1994) we find an interesting conclusion:
“The shame of the current generation in America is, contrary to much popular opinion,
that it has probably overinvested in seductive areas like pollution control, farmland
protection, and military R&D while underinvesting in dull areas like training,
equipment, and applied research. This investment strategy is long in plants and mortars
and short in plant and brainpower.”
This conclusion is interesting in that some aspects convince by common sense (yes,
better education) while other aspects are curious (worse pollution control ?). The article
contains the same confusions as Nordhaus (1995) and the same lack of substantial
research in the environment.
Appendix C. Nordhaus (2007b) on the role of federal statistical agencies
Key points, selected by me, in the Nordhaus Key points (i), are the following. Note by
the way that most of this selection can already be found in the earlier writings of
Tinbergen and Hueting.
(1) “The issues involved in understanding global warming and taking policies to slow
its harmful impacts are the major environmental challenge of the modern era. These
issues pose a unique mix of problems that arise from the fact that global warming is a
global public good, is likely to be costly to slow or prevent, has daunting scientific and
economic uncertainties, and casts a shadow over the globe for centuries to come. It is
also likely to be a major public-policy challenge for the indefinite future, and therefore
will require concerted efforts among natural and social scientists to understand its
genesis, potential future paths, impacts, and potential strategies to slow or mitigate its
impacts.”
(2) “The challenge of coping with global warming is particularly difficult because it
spans many disciplines and sectors of society and the natural world. Understanding the
full ramifications involves areas of geosciences, ecology, economics, political science,
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domestic and international law. Each of these disciplines has a well-established group of
researchers who are studying the implications and effects of global warming.”
(8) “Second, understanding and modeling the “downstream” ecological, environmental,
and economic effects of global warming are completely dependent on the results of the
“upstream” geophysical sciences. In a sense, economists are sitting by the river
retrieving the pearls or flotsam, as the case may be, of results from the upstream
geoscientists and their modeling. If upstream modelers do not provide high-quality
scenarios for abrupt climate change or sea-level rise or river runoff, then downstream
economists and policy analysts cannot incorporate high-quality results into their models.
In this respect, one respondent noted, “one of the greatest data/measurement needs for
better economic analysis is for more refined (i.e. geographically specific) biophysical
impact estimates from the natural sciences. For example, in the case of the United
States, perhaps one of the greatest economic impacts of climate change will be in terms
of snow pack and hence the flow of the Colorado River, on which much of western
irrigated agriculture depends.” The economic analyses can get nowhere without reliable
“upstream” geophysical analyses.”
(9) “(…) The IPCC working group charged with assessing the underlying science has,
in the Working Group 1 report of the Fourth Assessment, apparently decided to avoid
any probabilistic interpretations of emissions or climatic trajectories. As one researcher
commented on this approach, without temperature ranges and associated probabilities,
we “cannot do risk analysis of impacts, cannot show that there are near term risks, and
cannot evaluate commitment to various levels of abrupt change.” Who knows what
lurks in the tails of the distributions?”
(11) “Most of the researchers who responded to my inquiry about priorities for data
mentioned prominently the abysmal state of our knowledge about the impacts of climate
change. We can divide the terrain into market impacts and non-market impacts. In
general, it is the non-market impacts that pose the major uncertainties. Within this
category, we can subdivide those into managed and unmanaged systems. Human health
and gardening are managed non-market activities, while ecological systems would be
largely unmanaged. It seems likely that unmanaged systems are the major uncertainty.
Researchers identify ecological “hot spots” as particularly vulnerable targets of climate
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change, particularly abrupt climate change. (footnote) Several respondents mentioned
that we need, in one respondent’s words, “to accelerate our measurement of the use and
impact of ecosystems and ecosystems services of value to people over the short and
long term.”
(14) “Turning to the U.S. Federal statistical system, there is one glaring weakness – I
would even say one catastrophic error of omission. This is the absence of an
independent statistical agency that is dedicated to the design and collection of
environmental and ecological data. Indeed, when I did a search of environmental
statistics for the United States, I obtained an EPA web site that said, “The
Environmental Quality Homepage is no longer available.” (…) It is hard to see how the
U.S. can undertake serious research on environmental and ecological impacts without
an independent statistical agency devoted to this task. The major recommendation in
this area is that the Federal government move to develop an independent statistical
agency that is devoted to design and collection of ecological and environmental data.”
(21) “(…) I strongly urge the Energy Information Agency to take stock of its mission in
providing and supporting timely domestic and international data and long-term
integrated energy and economic models relating to energy and emissions trends in
global warming. The EIA could take a lead role in ensuring that energy and emissions
data models used in global-warming studies are comprehensive and reliable.”
(22) “I mentioned above that the major gap in our understanding of the economics of
global warming concerns impacts, particularly involving non-market sectors. A critical
component is collecting better (or at least minimal) data on various non-market
processes, particularly involving ecosystems and the environment. A second component
is valuation. The third missing component is an organizing framework in which to place
the quantities and values. This is the area of non-market accounts.”
(23) “There are several areas where a set of non-market accounts would be useful in
developing impacts studies. One respondent noted that “the environmental accounting
approach, and expanding that approach to non-market activities of the household, is a
useful way to frame data.” Such activities as “outdoor activities, exposure, time spent in
different activities – everything from caring for illness that may be environmentally
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related to time spent commuting – could help resolve why people make the choices they
do, and how they would value having to change those choices.””
(27) “Issues of non-market and environmental accounting have occupied the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) and CNStat for more than a decade. The BEA produced an
early version of its environmental accounts in 1994. This report contained an early draft
national balance sheet that contained estimates for non-produced assets. However,
shortly after this, Congress issued a stop-work order. CNStat sponsored two reports that
strongly endorsed non-market and environmental accounting, but BEA has undertaken
only limited work in these areas.”
(28) “The recommendation here is that the U.S. should move expeditiously to complete
the work plan laid out by the BEA in 1994 and endorsed by two reports from the
National Research Council on environmental and non-market accounting. To reiterate a
recommendation from the NRC Report on this: “Extending the U.S. national income
and product accounts to include assets and production activities associated with natural
resources and the environment is an important goal. Environmental and natural-resource
accounts would provide useful data on resource trends and help governments,
businesses, and individuals better plan their economic activities and investments.””
(33) “The summary recommendation here is that U.S. federal statistical agencies need to
become even more active in the international statistical system if we are to improve
international socioeconomic data for research in global warming. The quality of our
models with a global public good like global warming is in a deep statistical sense a
“weakest-link” technology. Obviously, the U.S. should not neglect its own data needs or
improvements in its own system. However, in the global warming area, there would be
a large payoff if the major federal statistical agencies could share their expertise to help
countries with limited expertise and resources to improve methodologies and data
systems.”
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